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The Erosion of the Clean Water Act Through Inverse 
Condemnation: Can Wetlands Withstand the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment? 
Despite increasing evidence of their ecological value, 1 wetlands2 in 
the United States are lost at a rate of 200,000 to 400,000 acres a year.3 
The vast majority of losses in the past have been due to draining and 
clearing of land for farming. However, in many states, urbanization is 
responsible for over ninety percent of coastal wetlands losses.• When 
landowners seek to develop wetlands, their interests in developing the 
property often conflict with environmental interests in preserving 
wetlands. 
Federal regulation seeks a compromise between these competing 
interests by requiring wetlands developers to obtain regulatory permits 
before development. 6 When developers are denied permits, they often 
I. Wetlands are one of the earth's most productive ecosystems. For example, they (I) capture 
and store sunlight, (2) protect against floods by storing and gradually releasing peak water flows, 
(3) contribute to groundwater discharge and recharge, (4) provide shoreline anchoring and dissi-
pate erosive forces, (5) store nutrients and efficiently recycle materials, (6) help to cleanse polluted 
and silt-laden water, (7) provide an important link in supporting the aquatic food chain (a func-
tion important to the production of commercial and sport estuarine fish and shellfish), and (8) 
provide important habitat for fish and wildlife. See generally P. SCODARI, WETLANDS PROTEC-
TION: THE Rou: OF EcoNOMICS 9-18 (1990); D. SALVESEN, WETLANDS: MITIGATING AND 
REGULATING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS 14-18 (1990). Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) regula-
tions provide that "[ w ]etlands are vital areas that constitute a productive and valuable resource, 
the unnessecary alteration or destruction of which should be discouraged as contrary to the public 
interest." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(l) (1990). The section goes on to identify the functions that wet-
lands perform (essentially as identified above). See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i)-(vii) (1990). 
2. The term "wetlands" means "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or 
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circum-
stances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. 
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) 
(1990). This broad definition has sometimes made it difficult for developers to determine when 
they are actually filling a "wetland." See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3582 (1991) (holding that Corps jurisdiction extended to an 
artifically created salt pit even though it was only wet during the rainy season). This comment 
suggests ways to map wetlands so this confusion may be reduced. 
3. P. ScoDARI, supra note 1, at ix, 8-9. These losses are attributed to agricultural use, urban 
development, vacation homes, and water resource projects. 
4. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 18-19. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that 
over SOo/o of U.S. wetlands have been destroyed in the past two centuries. Eleven million acres of 
wetlands-an area over twice the size of New Jersey-were converted to other uses between the 
mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. The Central Valley Wetlands, still the most important winter habitat 
for waterfowl in North America, have been reduced in acreage by 95o/o. /d. 
5. See, e.g., The Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), which requires 
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allege that such regulation has denied them the opportunity to con-
structively use their property and demand compensation for a "taking" 
under the fifth amendment. The constitutional status of restrictive gov-
ernmental land use regulations is one of the most controversial issues in 
land use law.8 
Part I of this comment analyzes the factors considered in deter-
mining when a regulation becomes a taking. Part II discusses the his-
tory of federal wetlands regulation and "takings" cases generated by 
such regulation. Part III analyses the impacts of "takings" regulation 
and suggests alternatives for successful wetlands regulation which will 
help to avoid inverse condemnation claims while providing protection to 
important wetlands. 
I. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The takings clause of the fifth amendment1 has proven to be the 
most pervasive and significant limitation on the power of the govern-
ment to regulate private land use.8 Courts have traditionally denied 
"takings" claims when property has not been physically taken. How-
ever, recent decisions indicate a possible trend toward allowing fifth 
amendment claims for "takings" of land through land use controls. 9 In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that a landowner may claim a taking 
under the fifth amendment, even when land is only temporarily 
"taken" through land use controls. 10 
developers to obtain "dredge and fill" permits from the Corps. Such permits are required by § 404 
of the Clean Water Act. /d. at § 1344(a). 
6. See Note, Compensation and Valuation for Regulatory Takings, 35 DE PAUL L. REV. 
931, 931-32 (1986). Underlying this controversy is the tension between the government's authority 
to regulate land use for the public welfare and the protection accorded private property by the 
fifth amendment's just compensation clause. Compensation is not ordinarily required when the 
government restricts the use of private property by enacting zoning ordinances or land use control 
laws. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I, 9 (1974); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 
369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962). However, a land use regulation may so infringe upon the landowner's 
use and enjoyment of the property right that it constitutes a de facto taking of private property for 
public use. This is known as inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court has defined inverse con-
demnation as "the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking when 
condemnation proceedings have not been instituted." United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 
(1980). 
7. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides, in relevant part, that "private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." /d. 
8. Ragsdale, A Synthesis and Integration of Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Regu-
latory Taking of Land, 55 UMKC L. REv. 213 (1987). 
9. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. 
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). 
10. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
(1987) (ruling on the issue of temporary takings without ruling on the merits of the case). On 
remand from the United States Supreme Court, the California Court of Appeal held that the 
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In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon/ 1 the Court recognized that 
land use regulations enacted pursuant to the police power may consti-
tute a taking if the regulations effectively infringe upon the beneficial 
use and enjoyment of private property to an unconstitutional degree. 12 
Recently, the United States Claims Court ruled that the denial of a 
section 404 permit/3 which excluded all economically viable uses of a 
property, was a "taking" requiring just compensation, even though the 
denial of the permit was a valid exercise of the police power. 14 
Takings are permitted only after certain requirements are satis-
fied. First, the "takings" claim must be ripe. 111 A fifth amendment 
claim is not ripe when a claimant has been denied a permit for only 
one proposal or for property not included in that proposal, unless that 
denial effectively precludes any subsequent proposals. 16 Second, if the 
claim is ripe for review, the owner must show that the regulation does 
not substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest or that he 
or she has been deprived of all reasonable economic use of his or her 
property. 17 It is not enough to have been denied the highest and best 
use of the property. 18 Finally, the government can only be held liable 
regulation involved in this case did not amount to an unconstitutional taking and denied the "tak-
ings" claim. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 
3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989). 
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
12. /d. at 413. Justice Holmes stated that "the general rule. . is, that while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking." /d. at 
415. 
13. All developers desiring to dredge or fill a wetland area must (as required by the Clean 
Water Act) obtain a§ 404 permit from the Corps before proceeding. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). 
14. See Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. 
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). 
15. Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 791-94 (1989). 
16. In Formanek, the plaintiffs were denied a permit to develop 11 acres of a 112 acre site, 
12 acres of which were upland and 100 acres of which were wetland. The United States Claims 
Court concluded that the claim was ripe for review for the entire site because the denial of the 
permit to develop the II acres effectively precluded the development of the entire site, including 
the 12 acres of upland. /d. at 798; see also Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 159 (concluding that the 
plaintiff was entitled to a takings claim for 12.5 acres of land even though the § 404 permit was 
only for 11.5 acres, because denial of the permit on the 11.5 acres of wetland also effectively 
precluded development of the I acre upland site); cf Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 175-76 (refusing 
to extend the denial of a § 404 permit for 98 acres of a I ,560 acre site to the entire site, even 
though the plaintiff argued that the denial would apply equally to the rest of the site). 
17. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1053 (1987); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (emphasis added). 
18. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 901; Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1193. The concept is that if a 
property owner receives any nominal value for its property, there can be no taking as a matter of 
law. However, taking jurisprudence has not required such an outcome. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 
160-61 n. 7. "[T]he determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a 
determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an 
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for a taking when its own regulatory function is so extensive or intru-
sive as to amount to a taking. 19 
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATERS REGULATION AND "TAKINGS" 
CASES 
A. Federal Laws Which Regulate the Use of Wetlands 
Man's concept of the value of wetlands has changed significantly 
in the past three decades. Scientific recognition of wetlands values has 
encouraged the enactment of several federallaws. 2° Federal regulations 
prohibiting discharges into the nation's waters date back to the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899 (Rivers Act). 21 Since then, various federal 
laws have provided regulations which can restrict development in wet-
lands. Since the Rivers Act was enacted, the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps) has been responsible for keeping the nation's navigational wa-
ters open. Section 10 of the Rivers Act prohibits dredging or discharg-
ing material in navigable waters without a permit. 22 The primary goal 
of this act was to maintain navigability for interstate commerce.23 
However, in 1968, in response to growing national concern, the Corps 
revised its permit review to include consideration of environmental 
matters.24 
1. The National Environmental Policy Act 
In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act211 (NEPA) was 
enacted. NEPA attempts to reconcile conflicts between economic 
exercise of state power in the public interest." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). 
19. De-Tom Enterprises v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 362, 365, (1977) (finding that a local 
county zoning action, not federal regulation, was responsible for the diminution of value and, 
therefore, the "taking" was exclusively non-federal). However, the Constitution would not pre-
clude a fifth amendment remedy merely because two government entities acting jointly or severally 
cause a taking. See Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 556 (1989). 
20. SeeR. GOOD, FRESHWATER WETLANDS: ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND MANAGEMENT 
PoTENTIAL 341-45 (1978). 
21. Ch. 425,30 Stat. 1151 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1988)); see also 
R. GooD, supra note 20, at 344-45. 
22. 33 u.s.c. § 403 (1988). 
23. D. SALVESEN, supra note I, at 21. 
24. Until at least 1968, the Corps restricted its concern to issues of navigation only. The 
Corps has since been required to evaluate all permits with regard to "all relevant factors, includ-
ing the effect of the proposed work on navagation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution, esthet-
ics, ecology and the general public interest." R. GooD, supra note 20, at 345. This is known as a 
"public interest review" in which the Corps balanced a project's reasonably foreseeable adverse 
impacts (environmental impacts) with its positive impacts (economic development). D. SALVESEN, 
supra note I , at 21. 
25. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1988)). 
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growth and environmental protection. It directs all federal agencies to 
consider the impacts of "major federal actions" on the environment and 
requires that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be prepared for 
actions it believes may significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.26 
2. The Clean Water Act 
Although various laws can restrict development in wetlands, the 
Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA),27 particularly section 404, has had 
the greatest impact. 26 The CW A extends the jurisdiction of the 
Corps. 29 Under the CWA the Corps and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) share responsibility for determining whether an area is 
a wetland and requires a section 404 permit. Although the Corps is 
responsible for issuing or denying permits, it must make decisions in 
accordance with environmental guidelines promulgated by the EPA. 
The EPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) review permit ap-
plications and provide recommendations concerning issuance, restric-
tion, or denial to the Corps. 30 
The Corps evaluates section 404 permit applications under a 
"public interest" standard. 31 This standard requires an evaluation of 
the probable impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed ac-
tivity on the public interest. A balancing test is used to weigh the bene-
fits against the detriments.32 Generally, a permit will be granted unless 
26. /d. NEPA does not prohibit development in environmentally sensitive areas but requires 
all federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of any federal decision. Although CW A 
section 404 permit applications are subject to this provision, the Corps estimates that less than 
0.5o/o of applications cover projects that, because of their likely impacts on the environment, will 
require an environmental impact statement (EIS). Baldwin, Wetlands: Fortifying Federal and 
Regional Cooperation, 29 ENv'T. 19 (No. 7 1987). 
27. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(1988)). 
28. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 21. The CWA prohibits "any discharge," including fill, 
into the "navigable waters" of the United States, except as provided by the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 
1341(a) (1988). 
29. The Corps now has jurisdiction not only over navigable waters in fact but also over their 
tributaries, interstate waters and their tributaries, and nonnavigable intrastate waters whose use or 
misuse could affect interstate commerce. See 33 C.F.R. 329 (1990); see also Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Calloway. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that the term "waters of 
the U.S." should be interpreted broadly). 
30. D. HooK, THE ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WETLANDS 373 (1988); see also 
Note, National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson: Content-Based Review of Corps Wetlands Deter-
minations Under the Citizens' Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act, 67 N.C.L. REv. 695, 699 
(1989). 
31. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990). 
32. For example, the Corps would weigh the benefit to the public to provide housing, against 
the detriment to the environment by developing the wetland. 
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the Corps determines that the action would be contrary to the public 
interest. 33 Important wetlands (those with greater ecological, economic, 
or aesthetic value), however, are subject to heightened scrutiny. This 
stricter standard requires that the permit be denied if the detriments 
equal the benefits.34 
3. Other acts which affect wetlands regulation 
Other acts which provide protection to wetlands are the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972,36 the Endangered Species Act of 
1973,36 the Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982,37 and the Fish and 
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934.38 Each of these acts provides pro-
tection for wetlands areas in addition to wetland protection statutes or 
regulations developed by the individual states. 
B. The judicial Pendulum in "Takings" Cases 
One of the first wetlands cases to address a takings claim was 
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsipanny-
Troy Hills. 39 There, the New Jersey court applied the "harm/benefit" 
theory, concluding that land may be regulated to prevent a public harm 
but not to confer a public benefit.40 In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme 
33. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1990); see also Formanek v. United States, 18 Ct. Ct. 785, 788 
(1989). 
34. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1990). 
35. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 
(1988)). The Coastal Zone Management Act provides financial incentives for states to adopt feder-
ally-approved coastal zone management programs to protect coastal resources, which include wet-
lands. Federal actions must conform with a federally-approved state program. If not, the state may 
veto the federal action. See W. MITSCH & J. GossEI.JNK, WETLANDS 445 (1986); D. SALVESEN, 
supra note 1, at 23. 
36. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 
(1988)). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 was enacted to protect rare plants and animals. The 
Act requires federal agencies to ensure that any action authorized will not directly jeopardize 
endangered or threatened species, or destroy their habitat, which may include wetlands. 
37. Pub. L. No. 97-348, 96 Stat. 1653 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 
(1988)). The Coastal Barrier Act restricts or eliminates federal subsidies for building on undevel-
oped coastal barriers. The Act does not prohibit development, but it does prohibit federal expendi-
tures and financial assistance for such development. 
38. Ch. 55, 48 Stat. 401 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 661-667e (1988)). The Fish and 
Wildlife Act requires the Corps to consider the comments of federal and state fish and wildlife 
agencies before issuing a § 404 permit. 
39. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
40. For example, a land use regulation may prohibit industrial uses in residential districts 
because it prevents the industrial uses from harming a residential neighborhood. However, a land 
use regulation requiring preservation of historic landmarks confers a public benefit and thus may 
constitute a taking. See D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAW 24-28 (2d ed. 1988). In Morris, the 
New Jersey court held that the municipal flood protection ordinance was designed to promote a 
public benefit-flood protection-not to prevent a public harm and was therefore a taking. 40 
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Court provided a different interpretation of the "harm/benefit" rule in 
just v. Marinette County. 41 There, a Wisconsin statute required all 
counties to adopt a state-approved shoreland zoning ordinance. Mari-
nette County's ordinance required a permit to fill wetlands within a 
certain distance from navigable waters.42 The Just family claimed that 
the ordinance constituted a taking since it diminished the economic 
value of their land. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the ordi-
nance was a reasonable exercise of the police power to prevent harm to 
environmental resources. The court concluded that the ordinance did 
not improve the public condition but only preserved the natural envi-
ronment from being destroyed by unregulated activities.43 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,"" the Su-
preme Court rejected the "harm/benefit" rule and adopted a "whole 
parcel" rule. In Penn Central, the Court upheld an historic landmark 
designation of Grand Central Station in New York City and prevented 
Penn Central from constructing a high-rise office building in the air 
space above the terminal. The Court refused to separate the air rights 
from the property below and instead viewed the property as a whole.411 
The Court agreed that the landmark designation imposed a severe re-
striction on Penn Central's use of its property but refused to conclude 
that this alone constituted a taking. 46 
The Penn Central decision has significant implications for wet-
lands law. Many wetlands regulations restrict development in wetlands 
but allow development on the upland portion of a site. Under the 
"whole parcel" rule, such regulation will not be considered a taking if 
the property owner is left with some viable economic use for the re-
maining portion of the property. 47 
The United States Court of Claims applied this rule in Deltona 
Corp. v. United States.48 There, the court held that a denial of a sec-
tion 404 permit for development on two of Deltona's five tracts of land 
was not a taking since Deltona could still develop its other three 
N.J. at 555-57, 193 A.2d at 241-42. 
41. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
42. /d. at 9-10, 201 N.W.2d at 764. 
43. /d. at 23-24, 201 N.W.2d at 771. 
44. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
45. /d. at 130-31. 
46. Id. at 136-38. The Court noted that the designation benefitted all citizens of New York 
City and that Penn Central was being forced to shoulder the entire burden of the designation. 
However, the Court also reasoned that, as a member of the community, Penn Central also re-
ceived benefits from the designation. /d. at 134-35. 
47. See D. SALVESEN, supra note I, at 35. 
48. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
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tracts.49 The court also applied a two-part takings test (Agins test),110 
first adopted by the Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon 111 and 
later upheld in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedic-
tis.112 Under the Agins test, a taking occurs if a regulation does not 
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest or if a regula-
tion leaves the landowner with no economically viable use of the prop-
erty.113 The court in Deltona found that the Corps' regulations substan-
tially advanced legitimate and important governmental interests and did 
not deprive Deltona of all economically viable use of its property. 114 
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States,1111 the Claims Court 
seemed to retreat from its position in Deltona. Instead of placing value 
on the legitimate and important governmental interest, the court held 
that the Corps' denial of a permit to mine phosphate in wetlands con-
stituted a taking. It reasoned that rock mining was the only economi-
cally viable use for the company's land.118 The court noted that leaving 
the plaintiff with a commercially worthless piece of property in the 
name of preserving wetlands would be charging the plaintiff with more 
than its fair share of this public cost. 117 Florida Rock is significant be-
cause it was the first case to hold that denial of a section 404 permit 
was a taking. 118 
The Claims Court again applied the Agins test in Loveladies 
Harbor, Inc. v. United States119 and reached a similar result. In that 
case, the plaintiffs had purchased 250 acres of land in 1956 and had 
developed 199 acres of that land before the enactment of both federal 
and state statutes regulating wetlands. The court held that the "whole 
parcel" rule only applied to the 12.5 acres at issue in the permit re-
quest and that if there were no economically viable use for that prop-
erty without a section 404 permit, then the denial would constitute a 
taking.60 The court based its decision solely on the second prong of the 
Agins test, stating that it would be "hard to imagine a takings claim 
49. Id. at 1192. 
50. Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1191-92. 
51. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
52. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
53. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
54. Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1192. 
55. 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985). 
56. /d. at 164. 
57. Id. at 177. 
58. See D. SALVESEN, supra note I, at 36. The takings claim in Florida Rock was recently 
upheld by the Claims Court on rehearing. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 
(1990). 
59. 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988). 
60. ld. at 398-99. 
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more deserving of compensation" given the severity of the economic im-
pact.61 The court concluded on rehearing that while a mere diminution 
of value will not constitute a taking, a taking does occur if plaintiffs are 
denied all economic use of their property.62 The court concluded that 
denial of a section 404 permit to fill 11.5 of the remaining 51 acres 
resulted in a taking and awarded just compensation for the 12.5 acres 
at issue.63 With the takings found in these two cases, the judicial pen-
dulum appears to have swung in favor of landholders, and, in a rela-
tively short period of time, wetlands law seems to have come full circle: 
from the "harm/benefit" theory in Morris Land to the "whole parcel" 
rule in Deltona, and after Loveladies and Florida Rock, back again to 
the original "harm/benefit" theory found in Morris Land.6" 
However, these decisions should not inhibit current wetlands regu-
lation. Florida Rock invloved an extreme situation where the factual 
circumstances necessitated a taking.66 Were the "whole parcel" rule to 
be literally applied to Loveladies, the holding would likely be reversed 
on appeal. 66 These cases are a striking reminder that as wetlands juris-
61. /d. at 396. The court discredited the "legitimate governmental interest" prong since "no 
court has ever found that a taking has occurred solely because a legitimate state interest was not 
substantially advanced." /d. at 390. 
62. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 157-60 (1990) (emphasis 
added). The court concluded that use for recreation and conservation were not viable uses because 
of the low dollar value per acre. /d. at 159. 
63. !d. at 161. 
64. Federal courts have not yet placed considerable weight on permanent disrupton to the 
environment in determining whether a taking has occurred. Were the federal courts to use the 
"harm/benefit" theory to prevent harm to environmental resources as the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court did in just, the result in Florida Rock and Loveladies might have been different. When the 
Supreme Court has considered takings claims where the character of the government purpose was 
to eliminate a public nuisance or serious threat the public health, it has found no taking. The 
rationale is that there is no property interest or reasonable expectation in the maintenance of a 
common law nuisance. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 489-91; see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 
(1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 
(1887). With the growing national concern for the environment, the destruction of wetlands for 
development might begin to be seen as a public nuisance, and the nuisance exception might then 
become viable in wetlands takings claims. For a general discussion of the value of wetlands, see 
supra note I. It should be noted, however, that the nuisance exception has never been used to 
deny compensation where the entire value of the property has been taken. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 
513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
65. The property was purchased before there were applicable federal statutes that required a 
permit, the disruption was temporary, and, most importantly, the permit denial deprived the 
plaintiffs of the only currently economically viable use of their property. See D. HooK, supra note 
30, at 384-85. 
66. The facts in Loveladies were strikingly similar to those in Deltona. In each case, the 
owners had purchased their property before federal statutes required wetlands regulation, each 
had developed a substantial portion of their site before § 404 permits were required, and each had 
already earned a substantial return on their investment before the permit denial. Loveladies, 21 
Cl. Ct. 153 (1990); Deltona, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981). Applying the facts equally, it would 
seem incongruous to hold that a taking had occurred in Loveladies using the "whole parcel" rule 
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diction expands to areas well beyond traditional navigable waterbodies, 
it will produce more conflicts with the land-use expectations of private 
property owners. Because regulation to protect important natural re-
sources is so firmly entrenched, it will likely continue, and permit deni-
als will rarely be found to constitute takings.67 However, these rulings 
should lead the Corps to make regulatory changes to prevent what 
might otherwise be takings. 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TAKINGS REGULATION ON 
WETLANDS AND SUGGESTED MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES 
A. The Impact of Takings Regulation 
Continued judicial insistence on finality and the refusal to separate 
a single parcel into discrete segments as prerequisites to the takings 
clause should, ideally, encourage regulators and developers to achieve 
their respective objectives through negotiations and agreements rather 
than through judicial decisions. Developers should be prepared to make 
concessions up front and should expect to include some sort of mitiga-
tion in their development plans. Successful applicants should be able to 
prove "not only that they have done all they could to minimize the 
adverse environmental impacts of their project, but that their projects 
may actually enhance the environment."68 
Regulatory agencies will, on the other hand, need to be careful 
about what conditions they place on a permit and must "ensure that a 
reasonable connection exists between the mitigation requirements and a 
public purpose."69 In fact, Executive Order 12630, "Governmental Ac-
tions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property 
Rights,"70 might require them to do just that. This order directs federal 
agencies to "evaluate carefully the effect of their administrative, regula-
tory and legislative actions on constitutionally protected property" in 
order to "prevent unnecessary takings."71 Depending on how rigorously 
it is implemented, the order could dampen federal enthusiasm to regu-
late wetlands. 72 
To alleviate this problem, there will need to be policies established 
to address some of the deficiencies in current wetlands programs. In 
1987, the Conservation Foundation held a National Wetlands Policy 
as applied in Deltona. 
67. D. HooK, supra note 30, at 385. 
68. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 37. 
69. /d. 
70. 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Mar. 18, 1988). 
71. /d. 
72. D. SALVESEN, supra note I, at 37. 
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Forum to address these issues. The Foundation recommended that the 
United States establish a wetlands policy to achieve "no net loss" of 
wetlands73 over the short run and to increase the wetlands base over the 
long run.74 The following section will discuss possible alternatives to 
accomplish these goals. 
B. Mitigation Alternatives 
The Corps has several mitigation alternatives: ( 1) avoid the impact 
altogether by not taking a certain action; (2) minimize the impact by 
limiting the degree of the action; (3) rectify the impact by repairing, 
rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment; ( 4) reduce or elim-
inate the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations; 
or (5) compensate for the impact by replacing or providing substitute 
resources.711 Several options are available to help meet these objectives. 
1. Clarify agency policy 
One approach to more effective wetlands regulation is through 
clarification of agency policies. Continued clarification and refinement 
of federal wetlands policies through generic administrative guidance 
and judicial decisions will be necessary to reduce controversies and con-
flicts which arise after persons have invested considerable time and re-
sources in development proposals.76 
2. Provide regional administration 
One of the most significant limitations of the current program is 
that it depends almost entirely upon an ad hoc, permit-by-permit ap-
proach. No action is taken until a specific development is proposed, and 
then the agencies involved react on a site-specific basis.77 Environmen-
talists contend the case-by-case method allows wetlands to be destroyed 
piece-by-piece, with individual projects slowly chipping away at a 
larger wetlands ecosystem with little thought given to cumulative 1m-
7 3. This means that wetlands created will balance wetlands destroyed. 
74. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 38. The forum also recommended: 
/d. 
expanding wetlands programs to cover all kinds of wetlands alterations, such as draining 
and excavation, and not just deposit of fill; 
implementing stronger mitigation requirements; 
expanding government wetlands acquisition and preservation programs; 
developing incentives to protect wetlands; and 
delegating responsibility for all wetlands regulations to the states. 
75. /d. at 32. 
76. See D. HooK, supra note 30, at 375. 
77. /d. 
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pact.78 A more effective approach would be to set management objec-
tives for wetlands experiencing significant threats on a regional basis. 
This would allow the government to tailor policies and programs on a 
regional basis to protect wetlands of different values from potential 
wetland conversion activities.79 
3. Implement a national ranking system 
Development of a national wetlands ranking system is another 
possible approach to improved regulation. Under a ranking system, the 
EPA and/or state agencies would rank wetlands according to their rel-
ative value. The degree of regulatory stringency would be varied, with 
the highest levels of protection being given to those wetlands with the 
highest value.80 Maps, which would provide information on the likeli-
hood of obtaining a permit for conversion activities in a particular wet-
land, could then be made available to landowners and permit appli-
cants. The maps would also guide the agency in its permit review.81 
The EPA currently lacks the resources and information to apply this 
approach nationwide. However, with intensive effort, wetlands can be 
mapped and ranked on a local, and perhaps, a statewide scale.82 
4. Enact technologyforcing legislation 
Another method of protecting wetlands would be technology-forc-
ing. Under this approach, Congress would encourage rapid technologi-
cal development by establishing presumptions that wetlands serve speci-
fied important functions with specified high values which would be 
diminished by development. A federal agency seeking to overcome these 
presumptions against development would need to furnish scientific 
proof that they overvalued a specific wetland or wetland region. This 
would encourage agencies to sponsor research into actual wetland func-
tions and values.83 This would also help speed up the ranking process. 
78. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 37. The Corps is now required to consider the cumulative 
effects of wetlands regulation in its permit process. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(3) (1990). 
79. D. HooK, supra note 30, at 375-76. 
80. /d. at 377. The ranking scheme would develop categories of regulatory response. The 
most stringent category would be permit denial or a designation that the site is unsuitable for 
alteration. A somewhat less stringent response applicable to a site ranked as more moderate in 
value might allow issuance of permits where loss of wetland functions was relatively slight and 
was fully mitigated on-site. A greater degree of impact might be accepted for sites at the next tier 
of ranking, if fully offset by off-site mitigation. Even at the lowest category, adherence to EPA 
guidelines would be required to assure that indiscriminate filling, even of low value wetlands, was 
avoided. /d. at 379. 
81. /d. at 377-78. 
82. /d. at 381. 
83. P. ScoDARI, supra note 1, at 85. 
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Each of the above methods will provide developers with meaning-
ful information when purchasing wetland property and, therefore, will 
put them on notice. This notice may effectively preclude a taking.8' 
However, there will still be times when regulations reduce the expecta-
tions of property owners such that alternatives will need to be made 
available to them. 
5. Permit development of artificial wetlands 
EPA guidelines prohibit discharge of fill material into wetlands "if 
there [are] practicable alternatives which would have less adverse im-
pact on the aquatic ecosystem."811 An alternative is practicable if it is 
"available and capable of being done after taking into consideration 
cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project pur-
poses."86 One practicable alternative is to develop an artificial wetland 
on a tract of land not presently owned by the applicant.87 It should be 
noted, however, that although the Corps believes that properly designed 
and constructed artificial wetlands can provide the same values and 
functions as natural wetlands, the EPA and FWS disagree.88 In fact, 
"[t]here are few, if any, published studies that have proven replacement 
wetlands to be equal to natural wetlands in terms of all their functions 
over a meaningful time span."89 
6. Provide reciprocal benefits 
There may be direct reciprocal benefits to offset regulatory im-
pacts, such as tax reduction or tax abatement90 and transferable devel-
opment rights. 91 Such benefits will be highly useful in the balancing 
84. See Ciampetti v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 557-58 (1989). 
85. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1990). 
86. Jd. at § 230.10(a)(2). 
87. See Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 788 (1989); see also Bersani v. United 
States Envtl. Protection Agency, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
88. D. SALVESEN, supra note 1, at 33. 
89. D. HooK, supra note 30, at 369-70. 
90. If an owner of regulated land has been denied a section 404 permit and can show that he 
is not earning a reasonable return on the property in its present state, the ordinance may include a 
plan which would enable the owner to earn a reasonable return on the site. This plan may include 
partial or complete tax exemption or remission of taxes. See e.g. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 112-13 n.13 (1978). 
91. Although a regulation may restrict an owner's control over his parcel, an ordinance may 
provide for a transfer of development rights which may even enhance his economic position. This 
may include: a transfer of development rights to an adjoining parcel (e.g., a 10 acre site with 
development rights of four units per acre would normally yield 40 units. If seven of these acres are 
wetland, then the entire 40 units would be allowed on the three acre upland. An additional bonus 
may even be applied for good design.); a transfer of development rights to another parcel owned 
by the owner of the restricted parcel (e.g., transferring the 40 units from the above example to 
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process required by a takings analysis. As the Court noted in Penn 
Central: "While these rights may well not have constituted 'just com-
pensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubt-
edly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed ... and, 
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact 
of regulation."92 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The fact that wetlands will be filled is inescapable, given the pre-
sent political and social climate in the United states. It is imperative, 
therefore, that regulators steer the direction of wetland loss away from 
the most important wetlands. The extensive annual loss of wetlands 
creates a need to assure more effective protection of important wetlands 
values. At the same time, a need exists to improve the predictability and 
certainty of regulatory decisions and to provide the public with a more 
coherent view of federal regulatory requirements. The management, 
maintenance, and preservation of wetlands can only succeed if built on 
strong scientific conclusions. "The case for protecting rather than devel-
oping [wetlands] will succeed only if people can be convinced of the 
functional values; sentiment carries little weight on economic balance 
sheets. " 93 
Regulatory takings issues do not present clear cut bodies of consti-
tutional law, and a formula needs to be set to determine where regula-
tion ends and taking begins. Although recent decisions have helped 
clarify federal agency roles, they have also muddied the waters. How-
ever, if federal and state agencies continue working toward providing a 
more consistent, predictable approach to regulating wetlands, the wa-
ters may begin to clear, and wetlands will receive the protection neces-
sary to remain a viable part of our ecosystem. As Theodore Roosevelt 
once said: "Men with the muckrake are often indispensable to the well-
being of society, but only if they know when to stop raking the 
muck."94 
Stephen R. Kelly 
another site entirely); or the possibility of selling these development rights to the owner of another 
non-regulated parcel (i.e., receiving the value of 40 additional units to another developer). See e.g., 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1978). 
92. /d. at 137. 
93. E. MALTBY, WATERLOGGED WEALTH 174 (1986). 
94. Theodore Roosevelt (Address given at the laying of the cornerstone, House Office Build-
ing, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1906). 
